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Abstract. This paper presents current trends in philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience, 
with a special focus on neuroscientists dealing with some topics usually discussed by philosophers of 
mind. The aim is to detect the philosophical views of those scientists, such as Eccles, Gazzaniga, 
Damasio, Changeux, and others, which are not easy to classify according to the standard divisions of 
dualism, functionalism, emergentism, and others. As the variety of opinions in these fields is 
sometimes a source of confusion, it is worth the effort to obtain an overall panorama of the topic. A 
general conclusion on epistemological and ontological issues, concerning the relationship between 
neurobiology and philosophy and the multi-level account of the embodied mind, is proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
Philosophical questions concerning the nature of the mind and its relationship 
with the body are usually addressed by philosophy of mind. This area of philosophy 
inherits the traditional issue of the relationship between the soul and the body, 
interpreted in modern terms as the mind and the brain. Whereas the classical view of 
the problem was thoroughly ontological, going back to ancient philosophers as Plato 
and Aristotle, philosophy of mind, born in the twentieth century, is generally more 
epistemological, posing its object of inquiry within a scientific framework. Its topics 
are similar to those treated by the cognitive sciences, such as neurobiology, 
computational science, and cognitive psychology. 
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These topics, namely perception, sensations, emotions, memory, language, 
thought, and free will, were typically considered by psychology. Scholars in this area 
face also questions concerning the nature of the mind and the meaning of the human 
person, who is seemingly constituted of mental capacities and neural processes, two 
dimensions related to the classical duality of soul and body. 
The novelty of philosophy of mind, compared with classical psychology, is that 
the problem is tackled in strong relationship withthe natural sciences. Two candidates 
in dealing with psychological notions such as thought, intelligence, decisions, and 
representations, are neuroscience and computational science. Neuroscience studies 
and explains from an empirical perspective all that was typically reserved to 
psychology. Computational science seems capable of reproducing and dominating 
representations and thought processes. Accordingly, it seems natural that philosophy 
of mind will turn out to be a kind of philosophy of neuroscience and of philosophy of 
computation, although more essentially the former, if we take into account the recent 
development and prestige of neurobiology regarding human problems. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the proliferation of “neuro-disciplines”, such as neurophilosophy, 
neuroethics, neurotheology, neuroeconomics, neuroaesthetics, and the like. 
The difficulty with the resulting discipline is that it does not share the facility of 
the older metaphysical psychology in acknowledging a spiritual dimension to the 
human person. As human thought appeared to be immaterial or not physical, 
psychology maintained classically a good relationship with theology. To think of God 
as an immaterial being and then to speculate on the immortality of the human soul 
beyond the destruction of the human body was very natural for many authors. But in 
contemporary philosophy of mind these issues appear more problematic, because 
ontological concepts, such as being, form, and essence, do not seem to be available in 
the general scientific environment, whereas scientific concepts, dealing with physical, 
chemical, and biological concepts, are very familiar to scholars. Subsequent to the 
Kantian revolution, metaphysics was viewed with suspicion by philosophers and 
scientists, while the natural sciences became more consolidated and capable of 
vindicating the privilege of truth. Consequently, the classical philosophical problems 
had to be investigated in dialogue with the natural sciences, and sometimes in 
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subordination to them. This is the present epistemological condition of philosophy of 
mind and philosophy of neuroscience1. 
According to this scenario, the first and perhaps most important problem of 
philosophy of mind and neuroscience is the alleged distinction between mental and 
neural acts or events, while the second problem, provided the distinction is accepted, 
is their causal mutual relationship. These two main philosophical questions are 
answered differently by a series of standard positions: dualism, neural monism, 
functionalism, emergentism, and non-reductive physicalism. 
This chapter will attempt to briefly present these positions, and to combine them 
with what can be understood as the philosophical thought of authors dealing with 
neuroscience rather than with a pure philosophical speculation. Many other problems, 
such as the relationship between neurobiology and philosophy, the extent of human 
freedom, the assessment of human actions in ethical issues, the particular orientation 
given to psychiatry, or the focus of educational efforts, depend essentially on the 
solution given to these fundamental questions. 
2. Standard Positions in Philosophy of Mind 
Philosophers of mind normally display an array of similar positions concerning 
the mind-brain duality. These different views can be found in any textbook on 
philosophy of mind2, 3, 4. My presentation attempts to go to the root of the problems 
and to indicate what I consider most relevant for the aim of this book. My account is 
clearly favorable to some kind of moderate dualism. I do not aim at being neutral on 
this issue. 
The positions can be delineated within the following lines. 
2.1. Dualism5. This traditional thesis claims that the human person is constituted 
by two kind of realities: one material and the other spiritual. In substantial dualism, 
the spiritual reality, known as the soul, spirit, or the mind, moves and guides the body, 
but it can also be affected by the latter. There is also the possibility of interaction 
between the soul and the body. Such a duality is attributed to animals and even to 
plants by Aristotle. 
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If the body and the soul are not understood as substances, they can at least be 
viewed in terms of properties, as is elaborated in property dualism. This kind of 
dualism considers a group of human actions processes and operations as material 
because they are empirically verifiable, whereas others, such as thoughts, intentions, 
and desires, are categorized as immaterial because they are experienced as qualia, 
completely deprived of material properties. Similar to the assertion of substantial 
dualism, here it is claimed that spiritual operations move or guide bodily processes: a 
human agent as such, him or herself, wants to move the hand, and thus moves it. 
Dualism can be held either phenomenologically or by common sense. It is very 
intuitive to experience our thoughts, feelings and decisions as something radically 
different from spatial material objects. Dualism can be also sustained by religious 
beliefs, and indeed, religion would be devoid of sense if all that exists were purely 
material. Materialism and atheism are intrinsically linked6. Finally, dualism can be 
argued and explained in philosophical terms. 
In spite of the various philosophical accounts of the soul-body or mind-brain 
duality, dualism is a strong and persistent conviction held by many people since it 
corresponds to direct knowledge, or to what could be nominated the common sense 
perspective. Even the most rigorous materialists cannot avoid to experience thoughts 
and consciousness. The efforts made to reduce all reality to material reality are 
normally too complicated. They must be argued again and again, struggling against 
what constantly reappears in common language and implicit belief. For example, 
think of the paradox of saying: “I think that this I does not exist”. 
2.2. Naturalism or physicalism. According to this position, nothing other than 
material substances or material properties exists. The apparent existence of mental 
acts must be reduced to something material, and this is why naturalism, or 
materialism, is often reductionist since it is committed to the effort of reducing an 
alleged entity to something different. Reductionism is also shared by what I will later 
call neurologist monism. The attempt to eliminate the notion that is reduced 
corresponds to the so-called eliminativism7, advocated by Paul and Patricia 
Churchland8, 9. 
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A reduction aims at being an explanation10. Thus, materialists typically argue 
that a thought is nothing but a neural circuit and that this circuit explains the 
presentation of a thought. This epistemological procedure is taken from physics. The 
phenomenical presentation of light, for example, can be reduced/explained to 
electromagnetic waves. The reduction is correct, but the phenomenal light –the light 
as we see it–still remains a fact a psychological or a mental fact. 
Notwithstanding the efforts to reduce the psychological process of vision to 
neurophysiological events, the phenomenon is not eliminated, so the duality between 
psychological and physical events persists. This is the paradox of physicalism, in its 
concern with reducing and eliminating the existence of mental properties. 
Naturalism or physicalism11 has its roots in the prestige of physical 
explanations. The reason that sustains the widespread materialistic belief is mainly 
epistemological. Physics deals with spatio-temporal objects, ultimately testable by 
empirical procedures, which are based upon what can be detected by external senses 
or by public instruments of observation. Therefore, non-observable entities as such 
will never exist, though they could be postulated as instrumental logical devices, such 
as physical laws or mathematical spaces, capable of explaining physical phenomena.  
The physical universe of discourse −the world as is viewed by physics− here is 
understood as closed or exclusive. Nothing can be postulated outside of this 
framework. God, the angels, souls, and mental entities are rejected because they do 
not fit into the ontological framework of natural sciences. Of course, it can be said 
that the world as it is seen by physics is an abstraction, because it is the result of 
selecting a series of basic properties (mass, space, movement, time, force) as a 
methodological choice for the explanation of all phenomena. In this sense, natural 
science is a partial view of reality. It does not comprehend reality as a whole12. 
Paradoxically, even sensations, the so-called qualia in philosophy of mind, are 
problematic for materialism. Psychological acts and states do not belong to the realm 
of physical and observable events13. Accordingly, psychic events, such as acts of 
vision, pain as a sensation, and so on, should be ruled out by being reduced to 
neurophysiological events that can be detected by our external senses or by 
instruments of observation. 
 6 
For instance, the sheer sensation of pain cannot be externally observed. Pain, no 
doubt, is quite physical, but as such it does not belong to the universe of discourse of 
physics. If this universe is taken as exclusive, then pain becomes problematic and has 
to be reduced, and as a psychological act it will be understood as nothing. Hard 
materialist philosophers view the psychological world with suspicion because they 
rightly feel that to accept that world could lead to the acknowledgment of something 
beyond matter. They opt to protect the choice of remaining within the closed natural 
scientific world. 
Now, how can reduction be accomplished? On one side, there is the notion that 
is supposed to be reduced, which in this case is the psychological reality: perception, 
representation, emotion, comprehension, or the Self. On the other side, some physical 
features (some functions of the human body) must be chosen as the matter to which 
the psychological events are supposed to be reduced. Three candidates are available 
for this operation: external actions and reactions, neurobiological processes, and 
computational procedures. So we have three possible positions. 
2.2.1. Behaviorism. Internal actions are behaviorism’s preferred object of 
reduction. Internal operations or states, such as emotions, decisions, and perceptions, 
have always some relation to external actions, or at least they can be ascertained 
through external reports and tests, so it is not difficult to attempt to assimilate the 
former within the latter. Accurate analyses, however, demonstrate that these two 
different types of acts are not equivalent. 
Philosophical behaviorism14, though not always known by this name, aims to 
translate internal acts into behavioral dispositions. Psychological behaviorism, 
instead, follows the scheme of stimulus/response, and the associated notions of 
reinforcement and reward. In both cases, dualism is supposed to be avoided. As is 
well-known, psychological behaviorism was eclipsed by cognitive psychology. Even 
so, this psychological school was not without fruit since it demonstrated the 
importance of paying attention to behavior when attempting to study and to follow 
psychological states. 
2.2.2. Neurologist monism. The reduction of mental acts to neurobiological 
processes might seem a more promising proposal. Perceptions, sensations, feelings, 
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and conscious or unconscious cognitive states normally show a clear neural basis. The 
acts of vision, touching, smelling, and the others associated with the senses can be 
described and explained in neurological terms. It can be claimed at least that mental 
acts have always some correlative kind of neural acts or states. This kind of 
correspondence is often considered under the category of supervenience15. The 
correspondence between both dimensions must be defined in very precise terms, 
which is not an easy matter. 
Neurologist monism claims that a psychological act is nothing more than a 
neurobiological event. This denomination is mine. Currently there does not exist a 
special name for this trend of thought in philosophy of mind, which at other times was 
known as the identity theory. This position seems to be similar to what I have called 
naturalism and can be seen as the most frequent version of naturalism in our times. 
Though many authors take for granted that this is the correct solution to the problem, 
the difficulties of this position have already been highlighted above. There is no doubt 
that the neurological dimension of psychological acts is essential, but it can also be 
demonstrated that it is partial. To perceive, to be conscious, is not exactly the same as 
a purely neural event. 
2.2.3. Computational functionalism. The third attempted reduction springs from 
computational science and could be indicated as computational functionalism16. This 
position apparently goes beyond reductionism as understood in neurologist monism 
and behaviorism. It seems to recognize a certain immaterial content inside the alleged 
black box of the internal acts. Functionalism in philosophy of mind is, in general 
terms, a sophisticated position that equates mental states with causal roles or 
functions17. The supporters of this position do not accept the simple experience of 
feeling as a decisive feature of mental acts. Pain, for instance, should be rather 
defined functionally. This approach is not necessarily incompatible with the 
acknowledgement of qualia as real internal experiences. Now the reductionist move 
appears clearly in computational functionalism. Mental acts could be identified with 
computational functions or with information processing. 
The key word here is information, which has several meanings connected with 
the transmission of messages and causal effects. Generically, information implies 
order in nature, an order introduced within an energetic physical basis. Order is a 
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functional notion related to a certain goal to be attained through a particular 
arrangement of elements in space and time. Living organisms have the capacity of 
controlling information, received from the environment and transmitted to the 
different parts of the body in order to maintain the typical self-organization that 
characterizes the living system. When this information control is associated with 
cognitive representations, for example with perception, then the living system, 
endowed with a nervous system for that purpose, is called an intentional or a 
cognitive organism. This is the case of animals and humans. However, it is possible to 
separate the flow of information from its natural basis and to treat it using an artificial 
device (a computer). This procedure is a calculation, namely a transformation, 
according to an algorithm, of some inputs into certain outcomes. 
It is tempting to say, then, that psychological operations or states should be just 
computations. Here inputs can be connected with outputs in a certain system through 
different computational procedures, as is typically done by computer. Computational 
devices are able to capture informational processes occurring in the physical world, 
particularly in organisms and brains, and to freely manipulate them so as to simulate 
and emulate natural or intentional processes, such as biological processes, diseases, 
perceptions, problem-solving, and decision-making. The task of the brain would be 
similar to the operations of a computer. 
Computational functionalism was strongly stimulated by the development of 
artificial intelligence and robotics. But a new sort of dualism, namely between 
software and hardware, has now appeared, especially because the software, 
corresponding to the mind, is multiply realizable in different physical media (e.g., a 
brain, a standard computer, a quantum computer, etc.). Therefore, the computational 
mind appears to be independent from its bodily realization. 
The problem with functionalism is that it concedes too little importance to the 
neurobiological basis of psychological states. It is easy to produce pieces of 
information manifoldly, just as a book can be printed or registered in any kind of 
computer. But this is not the case in a real cognitive operation or in an emotional 
state. Two persons may share the same thought, such as 2+2=4, but nevertheless each 
one of them has a personal thought. 
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This is the reason why neurobiologists normally pay little attention to 
computational functionalists. Engineers and computer scientists, instead, are more 
attracted by the functionalist proposal. The computational theory of mind favors the 
idea of a possible introduction of consciousness into a computational machine. But 
what kind of consciousness would a robotic consciousness be? It would be an 
imitation, not a real psychological state. Functionalism takes one aspect of mental 
states, the informational one, and ignores those states of lively action performed by 
real persons. In this sense, functionalism is a new form of reductionism. 
2.3. Emergentism and antireductionism. The recognition of irreducibly higher 
levels in a stratified natural universe –life over non-life, sensitive consciousness over 
life, and human reason over sensitive consciousness– produced in the twentieth 
century the anti-reductionistic position called emergentism. This position emphasizes 
the existence of new kinds of properties emerging from the construction of lower 
layers, provided they are organized in a certain way18. Namely, mental states naturally 
emerge from a precise organization of neural integrated circuits. 
There can be strong or weak versions of emergentism. The strong versions are 
not far from a moderate dualism, such as that found in Popper19. The weak versions 
(Bunge)20 interpret the emergent properties as new global structures constituted by the 
assembly of many parts. The whole is more than the sum of the parts, as a house is 
more than a pile of bricks. John Searle21 seems to follow an intermediate position. 
One of the problems faced by emergentism is the difficulty of providing an 
account of the causality between mental and neural events. Clearly the neural basis 
enables the subsistence of psychological states, and when this basis fails to function, 
impairment and disorders follow (bottom-up causation). However, it seems that also 
insights and decisions, for instance, the ideas flowing through my mind that cause me 
to write these lines, spontaneously select many brain activations in very specific areas 
(downward causation). Musical performance and linguistic abilities are responsible 
for specific brain activations and shape cerebral patterns in several ways. 
Emergentists usually stress downward causation while attempting to avoid 
interactionism in a dualistic sense. They criticize all types of reductionism, whether 
neurologist or functionalist. 
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Connections that give rise to correct sounds or utterances are reinforced during the 
learning process, while those that produce the wrong results are not; and the 
difference is determined by the semantic rules that govern the systems. In this sense, 
certain connections within the brain, as well as with nerves and muscles, are 
selected and shaped through a process of downward causation: from the contents 
and meanings of the musical and linguistic signs, according to the semantic rules of 
musical notation and ordinary language, to neural and neurophysiological 
connections. To this extent, content and meaning, which, as externalism has it, go 
beyond the individual’s brain and bear an objectivity of their own, are causally 
responsible for the actual shaping of the neural connections and networks required 
for a competent musical or linguistic performance22, p197-198. 
3. Neurophilosophical Proposals 
Besides the official philosophers of mind, neuroscientists who are sensitive to 
humanistic topics frequently present opinions on epistemological and anthropological 
items concerning the problem of mind and brain, the nature of knowledge, human 
identity and free will, and other themes that justly correspond to the philosophical 
domain, even in ethics and religion. Their observations on these questions are 
sometimes episodic or very brief and frequently found in popular books. However, in 
other cases, they can be more systematic, ambitiously delineating a complete view of 
man. Their reflections can be located on the frontier between science and philosophy. 
They convey an amount of useful information regarding neuroscientific achievements 
and usually enter the philosophical field without the sophistication of professional 
philosophers. Hence, they risk being naïve in subtle matters or unduly mixing what 
can be scientifically demonstrated with what needs careful philosophical 
argumentation. In spite of these difficulties, the contribution of these authors to the 
philosophy of neuroscience is undeniable and can be considered complementary to 
the philosophers’ efforts in the corresponding areas. 
It is not easy to identify clear-cut positions among the authors involved in these 
neurophilosophical writings. Some of them more directly engage the current problems 
in philosophy of science and propose a solution. The solution may be dualistic, as in 
the case of Eccles, which is currently rather exceptional, or materialistic. Quite a 
number of them share a less than well-defined naturalistic background. While they 
usually reject a drastic dualism, being open to some form of imprecise non-
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reductionism, they contemporaneously include neurophysiological items that can 
enrich the anthropological view. Two other related areas of research are neuroethics 
and the so-called neurotheology. The former studies not only the problem of the 
legitimacy of deep neural interventionsin human beings, with their consequences for 
personality and society, especially in the areas of health, education, marketing, and 
culture, but also the biological foundations of ethical inclinations and actions. 
Neurotheology is concerned with the correlations between religious experiences and 
brain activations. Depending upon their philosophical position, namely, either 
materialistic or perhaps open to the spiritual dimension of man, authors involved in 
these areas sometimes draw contrasting conclusions regarding the distinction and 
causality between mind and brain. 
Without any attempt at classification, this section will sketch out in broad lines 
those authors and insights which can be viewed as paradigmatic of these positions and 
as an expression of the major concerns and attitudes on the topics considered in this 
pages. 
Before continuing with these points, it can be good to mention certain 
ideological movements, such as antipsychiatrism and transhumanism, which have had 
an impact on many questions debated by neuroscientists and philosophers of 
neuroscience.The antipsychiatric movement evaluates standard psychiatric practices 
very negatively, partially in reaction to certain abuses, but also due to the specific 
vision of man of many of its followers. One aspect of this negative evaluation can be 
illustrated in the criticism of the very concept of psychiatric disorders (definition, 
classification, and treatment), something which is linked to the patients’ relationship 
with society. A balanced account of these topics must be considered in an overall 
philosophy of psychiatry23. Transhumanism claims that neural and genetic human 
enhancement of our abilities and potentialities are to be promoted even to the point of 
changing our species in the future into another, better post-human trans-species24. 
These movements, such as those dealing with fundamental ethical questions, 
involve an evaluation of the risks and benefits of medical and psychiatric 
interventions in the brain, both by means of pharmaceuticals and through 
computational interfaces. Positions regarding this problem range from optimistic 
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views, which soar to unlimited heights or to the transhumanism, to cautious and 
sometimes pessimistic caveats. 
The assessment of what contemporary neuroscience enables us to do in human 
and social affairs creates many challenges in social policies, in education, in 
medicine, and ultimately depends upon some basic views held by philosophical 
anthropology. Ethical codes and prudential practices are not enough unless we go to 
the ontological and anthropological root. In this sense, philosophy of mind and of 
neuroscience could be considered a crucial part of anthropology. In the following 
pages, the basic positions on this theme shall be presented, especially in some selected 
authors. 
3.1. John Eccles (1903-1997) was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1963 for his work 
on synaptic transmission. He was a disciple of Charles Sherrington (1857-1952), 
another Nobel Prize winner for research on neuron functions. Eccles25 held a clear 
dualistic position, which he shared with Sherrington26 and in some aspects with his 
colleague Robert Sperry27 (1913-1994), whose philosophical position is rather 
emergentist (Sperry won the Nobel Prize in 1981 for his studies on split-brain). The 
distinction between dualism and strong emergentism is not always clear-cut. In 
practice, Sperry diverges from Eccles only because the former does not believe in the 
survival of the immaterial mind after death. Popper’s philosophy, wholeheartedly 
followed by his friend Eccles, is likewise akin to Sperry on this point. 
According to Eccles25, 28, there is no way of explaining the unity of human self-
consciousness and its active role in guiding the conscious experience without 
thepresence of an immaterial entity, called the self-conscious mind. This immaterial 
entity is capable of interacting with cerebral networks and, more specifically, with the 
dominant linguistic hemisphere (normally the left) at the cortical level. The mind is 
the source of the continuous selective integration of various activated neural centers 
that are continuously reorganized (spatio-temporally) during the state of wakefulness. 
The self-conscious mind, which is the root of personal identity, plays a central role in 
the conceptual interpretation of the information it receives from cerebral patterns as 
well as a role in guiding attention in order to focus perception, to awaken memories, 
and to promote active voluntary movements of the body by acting upon several 
cerebral open modules. Eccles25 estimated that this conjecture should not be rejected 
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as anti-scientific, provided one accepts that it is normal in neurobiology to take into 
account psychological immaterial concepts, such as intelligence, comprehension, and 
the unity of the self. 
3.2. Michael Gazzaniga (1939) worked under the guidance of Sperry in split-
brain research. He stressed the importance of the dominant left hemisphere in the 
process of verbally and consciously integrating representations arriving from the 
various cerebral modules. He also studied to what extent patients with perceptual 
disorders resulting from cerebral damages tend to confabulate rational explanations of 
incoming data in a coherent way. This task is attributed to a specific area of the left 
hemisphere,where he places a so-called interpreter. Corresponding to the linguistic 
consciousness emerging in the left hemisphere, the function of this hemisphere is 
extended to the creation of all human beliefs and to the manipulation of the different 
“selves” –sometimes in conflict– that pertain to other regions of the brain, in order to 
maintain the appearance of one self with its own story and identity. This operation 
requires a special skill in order to alter memories so as to adjust them to the dominant 
self. In this sense, in Gazzaniga, what happens as a pathological confabulation in the 
case of impaired perceptions, as when someone does not perceive a leg as his own, 
rather attributing it to someone else, is transformed into a universal procedure for the 
production of ideas and beliefs, even in the ethical and religious domains29, 30, 31. This 
position, although emergentist, is actually not far from materialism since the 
interpreter is simply produced by the left hemisphere. 
The interpreter constantly establishes a running narrative of our actions, emotions, 
thoughts, and dreams. It is the glue that unifies our story and creates our sense of 
being a whole, rational agent. It brings to our bag of individual instincts the illusion 
that we are something other than what we are. It builds our theories about our own 
life, and these narratives of our past behavior pervade our awareness32, p174. 
There is something unintelligible in the notion of the interpreter in Gazzaniga. It 
is a creator of everything that one thinks in relation to himself and to the world, a 
fictional person that does not truly correspond with oneself. To say that this person is 
generated by the left hemisphere is a very obscure statement. We can understand that 
brain injuries produce pathological perceptions, but it is vacuous to say that the brain 
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generates ethics, philosophy, religion, etc. Paradoxically, dualism is resuscitated, but 
in a strange way: the dualism of the interpreter and the brain. 
3.3. Jean-Pierre Changeux (1936-), a well-known French neurobiologist, 
studied those allosteric mechanisms involved in the function of nicotinic receptors 
and related to cognitive functions. On the basis of these studies, he formulated a 
theory of epigenesis by synapse selection. He also proposed a theory on the global 
neuronal workspace, which was associated with consciousness. A great humanist, 
Changeux published several books on the neuronal basis of cognitive and affective 
consciousness as well as on neuroaesthetics33. He was also interested in the problem 
of the biological foundation of ethics. His concern for certain topics, such as religion, 
ethics, cognition, truth, beauty, and the good, brought him close to the field of 
philosophy. 
Changeux adheres to an “enlightened” materialism, claiming that the neural 
structure of man34 is sufficient to explain consciousness, ideas, love, and ethical 
problems, such as the need for tolerance and reciprocal respect, human rights and 
obligations, and even the existence of a universal natural ethics based on fraternity, 
freedom, and peace. The idea that there is something beyond the human body, spirit 
or mind, must be abandoned as useless and anti-scientific. 
It is difficult to understand how can Changeux believe that he is able to draw his 
ethical convictions from neurobiology. In a book published together with the 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, entitled, What Makes Us Think35, the latter tries 
unsuccessfully to convince Changeux that the neurobiological perspective is partial 
and insufficient in providing a real foundation for ethics, unless one previously has 
ethical convictions. There is a fundamental methodological obscurity when too many 
human achievements are supposed to be simply the result of the structural and 
functional dynamics of our nervous system. This point will be highlighted by the 
following two authors. 
3.4. In 2003, Maxwell Bennett (neurobiologist, 1939-) and Peter Hacker 
(philosopher, 1939-) published a book on the philosophical foundations of 
neuroscience36, a publication which was quickly followed by another in 2008 on the 
history of cognitive neuroscience37. They asserted that too frequently many 
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neuroscientists uncritically attribute to the brain, or to parts of the brain, 
psychological acts that should properly be assigned to the person. To say that the 
neurons perceive, that a neuronal circuit decides, that our hippocampus remembers, or 
that some cerebral region interprets is not false, but rather nonsense. This kind of 
discourse is a mereological fallacy, referring to the parts what should be ascribed to 
the person, which is not a mere sum of the parts.These authors aim at bringing some 
conceptual clearness to cognitive neuroscience, in order to avoid reductionism and 
materialism based upon an abuse of language. 
We do not know what it means to say that the brain thinks, fears or is ashamed37, 
p255. 
These authors accept that we understand, love, or perceive, thanks to the brain, 
but not that the brain itself is the subject of those acts. Neuroscientists can discover 
that some neuronal events are related to psychological acts, but nothing more. 
Bennett-Hacker are not dualistic since they also deny that psychological operations 
should be referred to consciousness or to the mind. 
To ascribe a mind to a creature is to say that it is a creature with a distinctive range 
of capacities: in particular, capacities for concept-exercising thought, self-
consciousness, memory and will37, p13. 
These are the capacities that confer the status of person. But the authors do not 
develop a theory of the human person, nor do they explain in what sense the brain is 
causally responsible for our psychological acts. Their position seems to be close to 
Aristotelian-based views. 
It would be better to say, with Aristotle, that human beings are ensouled creatures 
(empsuchos) −animals endowed with such capacities as confer upon them, in the 
form of life that is natural to them, the status of persons37, p262. 
3.5. Neuroscientists contributing to improve the anthropological view of man. 
Neurobiologists, including those already mentioned, sincerely think that they 
contribute to a better knowledge of man, and they certainly accomplish this task. This 
section will refer to certain neurobiologists whose discoveries and theoretical 
reflections, independently of a more or less clear account of the specific topic of 
philosophy of mind, make specific contributions that could quite well be integrated 
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into a philosophical vision of the human person. These discoveries and reflections 
necessitate, needless to say, further discussions and adjustments. What is more 
encouraging, the list could be very long; however, the constriction of space limits us 
to a brief selection. 
Antonio Damasio (1944-) investigated the role of emotions in knowledge, 
specifically in the basic psychosomatic levels of human consciousness. His work 
delineated a new picture of primary and secondary emotions, moods or background 
affective states, and feelings. He proposed useful distinctions between an unconscious 
protoself, linked to the overall state of the organism, a higher core consciousness, and 
the Self, based upon an extended or autobiographical consciousness38. The interplay 
between consciousness, body and feelings, with relation to the environment, is far 
from the older simplistic views that go back to the rationalistic account of man and to 
Descartes. This interplay is a dynamism addressed to the consolidation of homeostatic 
states tending to “the good life” of the human person. Damasio’s philosophical 
preference in philosophy of mind tends towards Spinoza rather than to Descartes: the 
mind is like the “idea of the body”39. 
Gerald Edelman (1929-2014), winner of the 1972 Nobel prize for his studies on 
the immune system, developed a theory of human (and animal) cognition and its 
neural substrate, based upon an idea that can be labeled as neural Darwinism. This 
hypothesis posits a spontaneous neuronal process of selection between populations of 
neurons, in contraposition to the idea of information processing by instructions40. 
Leaving aside technical details, this hypothesis is convergent with research on 
epigenesis through synapse competition in Changeux. 
Another major thesis in Edelman is the role of mapping in brain activity, which 
at some level of the brain is a way of creating representations of the objects perceived, 
similar to the mapping of the human body contained in the somatosensory area of the 
cortex. There is a continuous re-entry or informational exchange between brainmaps 
receiving various kinds of information from different areas (this point is convergent 
with Damasio’s views on the same topic).There are also brainmaps of maps, a process 
that explains the formation of concepts, memories and learning, beginning with the 
aforementioned Darwinist principle of selective competition between brain synaptic 
patterns41. 
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In the same vein, Christof Koch and Giulio Tononi investigated the neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCC). Tononi holds that the basic substratum for being 
conscious, i.e., awake, is a wide group of selected neurons firing together according to 
adequately synchronized oscillations associated with the talamo-cortical system42, 43. 
The NCC is not a special area, but a talamo-cortical network distributed throughout 
the brain. This theory 
introduces a measure of integrated information called φ, quantifying the reduction of 
uncertainty (i.e., the information) that is generated when a system enters a particular state 
through interactions among its parts, above and beyond the information that is generated 
independently within the parts themselves (hence integrated information)44, p254. 
This measure quantifies the neural requirement to be conscious in a context of 
biological complexity and provides the possibility of explaining unconscious 
cognitive states, such as that linked to nearly automatic behavior, while opening the 
way to deeper cognitive unconscious states corresponding to creative pre-
representational states. 
Cognitive consciousness has to be completed with affective consciousness. This 
new understanding of consciousness became Joseph LeDoux’s (1949-) object of 
research. He considered neural dynamisms connected with basic emotions to be 
linked to animal survival, nutritional, and sexual behavior45. His research was 
complementary to that accomplished by Damasio. Jaak Panksepp (1943-), who 
coined the expression affective neuroscience, presents an ambitious scenario in animal 
behavior, integrating complex emotional systems, such as seeking, pleasure, pain, 
panic, rage, anger, and anxiety46. These systems, based upon instincts, are 
unconscious, but have conscious manifestations. They are realized through neural 
circuits related to meaningful stimuli that have an impact on perceptual systems and 
preside over behavioral responses, such as defense, attack, and the search for food. 
The whole of these systems constitutes the affective dimension of consciousness, 
which is rooted in subcortical brain levels with projections into the cortex. Panksepp 
advocates the existence of an unconscious affective Self, involving subcortical and 
cortical regions, both in animals and in humans. 
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The thought-provoking experiments performed by Benjamin Libet (1916-2007) 
had a special impact on the neurophilosophical discussions on consciousness. A 
person is asked to freely move his or her finger or hand at any moment within a range 
of time, and to tell, by pressing a button, the exact moment in which he or she was 
aware of the decision to perform the motor action. Electronic devices detect the 
correlated neural activations and the movements of the muscles. The result was the 
delineation of a specific neural firing called readiness potential, which briefly 
preceded (nearly one second, but in later experiments even longer) the awareness of 
the decision47. 
A quick reductionistexplanation of this experiment, such as “the brain decides 
for us”, can arguably be avoided, when the conditions and limitations of this 
experiment are analyzed. Simultaneously, insights on the role of previous 
unconscious preparations for decisions can be drawn. The experiment also provides a 
better understanding of the different levels of voluntary actions, some of which can be 
clearly planned, while others can be accomplished in a semi-automatic way. These 
neuropsychological findings leave the nature and the relationship between 
consciousness and will open to debate. 
Another discovery in neurobiology, important for its potential implications in 
the philosophy of man, refers to the mirror neurons. This topic has become very 
popular, finding a place in books and magazines and providing an occasion for 
speculation and debates in many fields. The fact that the observation of meaningful or 
teleological actions accomplished by other subjects provokes the firing of sensory–
motor specific neurons in the observer seems to indicate that the observer mimics the 
actions of others, at least in imagination. In this sense, there is a kind of natural 
participation in what people see or perceive in others’ actions and passions, such as 
pain. This form of knowledge is relevant for anthropological topics, such as empathy, 
which is theorized by phenomenologists, and also for a better comprehension of the 
process of learning by imitation48, 49. 
Some authors consider this discovery a breakthrough in the history of 
neuroscience50. Obviously, mirror neurons cannot be made responsible for the entire 
framework of personal interrelations. However, if integrated with many other aspects 
of brain dynamics, they do play a role in an account of the human and animal mind 
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and consciousness in which relations, even from the prenatal period, must be put at 
the center of the human person and in his or her development in cognitive and 
affective states. Accordingly, family, friendship, and society appear to be essential in 
evolving human life. This idea is far from that of the traditional approach which 
tended to view mind and brain as isolated items. 
From the previous convergent neurobiological accounts concerning 
consciousness, some comprehensive conclusions can be drawn. These provide a 
whole vision of the human person, under the various labels of the emotional brain, the 
social brain, the empathic brain, and the like. To these aspects touching upon the 
higher levels of the embodied mind, as it is often called, there can be added rational as 
well as emotional dimensions regarding ethical and religious behavior inasmuch as 
they can be followed in their cerebral expressions. 
Neuroethics, both theoretical and empirical, the latter using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), considers, among other things, the interactions between 
cortical and subcortical networks in the brain, attempting to assess their weight in 
moral reasoning, judgments, desires, and impulses related to ethical behavior51, 52, 53, 54. 
Another field of interest in neuroethics is the cerebral corresponding patterns, 
occasionally investigated through connectionist models, in which stable states of mind 
are related to virtues and mindfulness55, 56. 
Something similar can be done regarding religious experiences. This field of 
study is usually called neurotheology. A more precise name would be neurobiology of 
religious and spiritual experiences57. Different neurotheological perspectives range 
from reductionistic views, which propose that these experiences, such as mysticism, 
meditation, and religious beliefs, are merely a product of particular brain states and 
activations, to an account of different psychological states (cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral) based upon special brain circuits and associated with religious acts that 
are considered to be an authentic anthropological dimension related to God. 
This field is very wide and complex. Religious acts, like any other human 
performance, have certainly a neural substrate, although it may not necessarily be 
specific. These acts, which can be very different and can be realized in various ways, 
can exercise a downward causation upon brain circuits (motivational, cognitive, 
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emotional). Inversely, particular neurophysiological states modulating moods, 
motivations, etc., can develop an upward causation that affects the way specific 
religious acts are experienced by individuals or groups. 
The relationship between theology and neuroscience is in some way similar to 
the relationship between theology and psychology of religion. But the claim that 
neuroscience explains religion would be analogous to claiming that neuroscience 
explains mathematics, literature, philosophy, an so on. Neuroscience is an important 
auxiliary discipline for the understanding of many aspects of human behavior, but it is 
not the key to a complete comprehension of man. 
3.6. Enactivism, among whose proponents are to be listed Francisco Varela, 
Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, and Alva Noë, can be considered a psychological 
and anthropological approach competing with the classical philosophies of mind. This 
latter had become overwhelmingly dominated by an isolationistic view of mind and 
brain58. Such a perspective, typical of dualism, materialism, and functionalism, stands 
in stark contrast to enactivism, which emphasizes the active relationship of bodily 
agents, or humans, to the environment and to the world.  
Enactivism rejects the representationist view of a brain primarily concerned 
with its own states and subjective representations. The brain is important, but it 
cannot be seen as a center endowed by cognitive powers that simply creates the 
world. The brain is a part of an organism, viewed as a complex system, and the mind 
is not only a function of the brain, but is an aspect of the entire body (embodied 
mind). The unity of the embodied mind and brain is “extended” to the world through 
action (enactive mind), while at the same time the world appears to the agent as 
functionally patterned in accordance with his or her needs, capacities, and 
experiences59. Reducing the human being to the brain is parallel to the Cartesian 
reduction of man to consciousness. 
Thomas Fuchs (1978-), a German philosopher and psychiatrist endorsing 
enactivist claims, presents a philosophy of neuroscience in which the brain is 
understood as a relational organ rather than a mere information processor60. It is an 
organ of the person, and not the seat of consciousness or of a mind. Its function is to 
integrate experiences so as to regulate and modulate the entire organism, to transform 
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information, and to enable communication with others while simultaneously 
mediating the various cycles of organism-environment interactions. Biological 
plasticity enables the brain to be in a continuous process of transformation, flowing 
from the interactions of the person with the physical environment, culture, ideas, and 
other persons. The brain is an organ of possibilities that are accomplished through 
neural processes and whose agent is the human person. The plastic condition of the 
brain enables the individual to grow as a person through experience and to create his 
or her own personal history. The person –not the brain– thinks, lives, and interacts 
with the world, thanks to brain activity. Fuchs strongly criticizes Thomas Metzinger’s 
thesis according to which the Self would be a purely phenomenic construction of the 
brain61. 
Fuchs follows a phenomenological approach in a broad sense of the word, 
coherent with the enactivist premises in psychopathology. Mental disorders, he 
argues, must be seen in all of their dimensions, as they disrupt the unity of the person 
and his or her relationships with the environment. Psychiatric therapies should be both 
biological and psychological62. Contrary to the methodology of reductionism, the 
therapists in this field should bear in mind the circular complex causality within a 
systemic biological framework. Any single interaction within the system has holistic 
effects at all levels. 
Interventions and psychiatric treatment are efficacious, according to Fuchs, 
whenever they follow the systemic and ecological concept of mind and brain63. This 
idea implies a comprehension of the interconnection between psychological, social, 
and pharmacological approaches. Psychological therapies influence the structure and 
functions of the brain by altering synaptic plasticity and gene expression, following a 
top-down causality. Conversely, neuropsychological and biochemical dysfunctions 
influence moods, emotions, and ways of perception, exercising a bottom-up causality. 
This is a circular complex causal process displayed between the brain, the 
organism, mental or psychological states, and interactions with the environment, with 
the brain acting as a mediating entity64. There is no separation, but rather a reciprocal 
transformation or translation between psychological and biological processes. 
Depression, for instance, is seen by Fuchs as a psychophysiological 
desynchronization65. Here a loss with which the individual is unable to cope is 
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translated by the brain into a neurobiochemical pattern affected by the uncoupling of 
rhythmic physiological processes, which in turn increases depressed mood. Every 
level triggers and influences the other. Analogous views can be supported regarding 
schizophrenia and many other mental disorders66. The classic positions in philosophy 
of mind examined in the first part of this chapter, such as dualism and functionalism, 
are unable to obtain these insights into psychopathology. 
4. Conclusion 
Among the many conclusions one can draw from the delineation of the different 
positions enumerated in these pages, two considerations can be proposed. The first is 
epistemological. Neurobiology, as far as it is concerned with human capacities, such 
as language, reasoning, understanding, and free decisions and actions, is not purely 
biological. It is a hybrid science that presupposes and employs anthropological and 
ethical knowledge67. This epistemological feature is unique in neuroscience. It entails 
a complementary interaction between the anthropological (as well as psychological) 
and the biological perspectives. As a purely biological science, neuroscience involves 
a partial and not a total explanation. 
The second consideration is ontological and is the basis of the former. The 
human person, and in a different way, animals as well, is a multi-layered complex and 
systemic unity. Each level, the vegetative, the sensitive to various degrees, and the 
rational, possesses its own autonomy while at the same time it influences the others, 
not extrinsically, but essentially, according to the various modes of integration. An 
important way of integration could be understood following the hylomorphic 
Aristotelian model (taken in a broad sense) that explains how higher levels are 
capable of giving a new sense to lower and more material levels while at the same 
time depending upon the material conditions of the former68. Such is analogous to the 
game of chess, wherein intelligent moves and the rules of the game provide a new 
dynamism to the physical chess pieces, which otherwise merely obey gravitational 
and other physical laws. Accordingly, there are many senses of being causally 
influent, in several reciprocal directions. 
The limits of dualism, materialism, and functionalism are overcome thanks to 
this systemic view69, 70. The final pages of this chapter were dedicated to enactivism 
 23 
and to Fuchs’ view because this approach seems more complete and promising than 
the others. The Aristotelian framework, as understood in hylomorphism, and the 
complex unity of the human person adds only a more comprehensive ontological view 
to this perspective. 
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